1.4.5 Hume bestrijdt Spinoza.

This gives me an occasion to take anew into consideration the question concerning the substance of the soul; and though I have condemned that question as utterly unintelligible, yet I cannot forbear proposing some further reflections concerning it. I assert that the doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism, and will serve to justify all those sentiments for which Spinoza is so universally infamous. From this topic I hope at least to reap one advantage, that my adversaries will not have any pretext to render the present doctrine odious by their declamations when they see that they can be so easily retorted on them.

In een behandeling van eerst klassieke sceptici en daarna moderne filosofen gaat Hume in tegen Spinoza n.a.v. diens overtuiging dat er een alomtegenwoordige Substantie is: pantheisme.  Over de connectie tussen Hume en Spinoza is gepubliceerd door Wim Klever,  Annette C. Baier, Frank J. Leavitt en Vance Maxwell.